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Executive Summary  
 
As part of the ecumenical campaign 2011, Bread for all and the Swiss Catholic Lenten fund in 
cooperation with the South African Bench Marks Foundation have conducted an exclusive study on 
the activities of the Swiss commodities group Glencore International AG in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). The study, based on a desk research carried out in Switzerland and a 
field visit of four researchers in the DRC, aimed at assessing the impact of Glencore’s investments 
on the Congolese economy, society and environment. The study reveals disturbing results.  
 
In recent years, Glencore has become one of the leading commodities groups in the world. The 
company, based in Baar in Switzerland, has offices or factories and mines in 40 countries. In terms 
of revenues, with USD 145 billion in the year 2010, Glencore is far ahead of all other Swiss 
corporations. However, the company is still not well known by ordinary Swiss consumers: 
Glencore’s customers are corporations in sectors such as the car, steel or energy industry.  
Since 2002, Glencore pursues the strategy of expanding control over the entire value chain of 
commodity business. This includes investments in Africa, especially in Zambia through the Mopani 
Copper Mine and more recently in DR Congo, through Katanga Mining Limited (KML). Glencore 
International granted KML in November 2007 a first loan of USD 150 million and in January 2009 
a second of USD 100 million, partly convertible into shares of KML. Glencore converted its 
convertible loans in spring 2009 and today owns nearly 75 per cent of KML. This deal with KML 
involved a contract which entitled Glencore to sell for the next ten years the cobalt and copper 
extracted in the mines of KML.  
 
The investment promises a significant return. KML has six copper and cobalt deposits in the 
Katanga province spread over an area of more than 40 km2, which is more than the area of the 
Swiss canton Basel-Stadt. Thanks to further investments, KML aims to become the world's largest 
provider of cobalt and the most important producer of copper in Africa by 2015 (with respectively 
30’000 tons and 310’000 tons of annual production).  
 
The investigation of the Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund, Bread for all and the Bench Mark Foundation 
highlights that despite high yields, Glencore and its subsidiary KML don’t seem to care about the 
economic, environmental and social impact of their mining activities. The criticism concerns in 
particular three areas: contracts, compliance with human rights and tax issues.  
 
1. Unfair contracts: the resources of Katanga are being plundered  
 
The activities of KML, including the mines in Katanga, are based on concessions that were 
negotiated after the Mobutu dictatorship and the civil war in a devastated country with widespread 
corruption. Therefore, the contracts for the award of exploration licenses were reviewed from 2002 
to 2005 by the DRC government and parliament, but also by global audit firms mandated by the 
World Bank. All these assessments denounced these contracts for being unbalanced and contrary to 
the interests of the Congolese population. Contrary to the requirements in the Congolese Mining 
Code (“Code Minier Congolais”), the mining concessions were never put out to tender or 
renegotiated. Also, no independent body has been called upon to determine the value of the assets 
contributed by the Congolese state. Rather, the Directorate of the state-run company Gécamines 
negotiated behind closed doors with Belgian and Canadian private investors. Despite these flaws, 
DRC President Kabila accepted in late 2005 the creation of two joint venture companies (Kamoto 
Copper Company (KCC) and Copper and Cobalt Project (CCP)) and the assignment of key fields of 
the former public company Gécamines.  
 
When the rights to exploit these deposits were definitively handed over to KML, the terms of 
contract were not fundamentally changed and remained unfair: Gécamines handed over not only 
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large deposits of copper and cobalt (about 15.9 million tons of proved reserves), but also two 
manufacturing plants. Despite these contributed assets, the former state-owned company Gécamines 
today owns only 25 per cent of the joint venture, when it should own 50%. In other words, Glencore 
exploits one of the richest deposits of the world in natural resources, without leaving a fair share to 
the Congolese side. Instead, the mining activities consume a significant portion of the scarce 
electricity in the region, put an extra strain on the bad roads and pollute the environment.  
 
2. Human rights violations  
 
The investigation in the mining region of Katanga impressively demonstrates what the social 
consequences are and how human rights are constantly violated. The most serious problems are: the 
precarious situation of artisanal miners, the working conditions in the mines of KML and the impact 
on communities in their vicinity.  
 
First, artisanal miners: According to the field survey, KML buys minerals from artisanal miners 
working on its concessions including Tilwezembe and Luilu. However, the subsidiary of Glencore 
buys the copper and cobalt not directly from the miners. Suppliers are rather middlemen who work 
primarily in the city of Kolwezi. In the artisanal mines, catastrophic working conditions prevail: 
without protective clothing and appropriate equipment, sometimes almost with their bare hands, the 
miners are digging holes and tunnels. To descend into the mines, they have to climb huge rubble 
hills, where they are constantly threatened by slide and rock fall. Therefore, accidents in the mines 
are frequent. The miners, who have no insurance or social protection, often can’t afford to pay for 
medical expenses. Child labour is widespread: For the Katanga region alone, the study speaks of 
over 30’000 children and young people, who carry heavy bags of 20 kg of ore, clean minerals in 
rivers or dig the earth. A lot of children were observed, selling ore near the mines, where KML buys 
its minerals.  
 
However, once KML wants to extend the industrial mining to areas with artisanal mines, small-
scale miners are ruthlessly expelled. According to the study of Bread for all and the Catholic 
Lenten Fund, more than 10’000 miners were driven out of two mines between August 2010 and 
February 2011. In one case, according to local sources, the police had also used violence and 
several people have been injured.  
 
Secondly, working conditions in the mines of KML: According to multiple sources, the Kamoto 
underground mine, which belongs to KML, is one of the most dangerous mines in Katanga 
province. On the site, the safety regulations are rarely respected, and signs with basic safety rules 
are largely absent. The result: in a timespan of only eleven months, between April 2009 and 
February 2010, three fatalities occurred.  
 
In terms of health, the miners receive no protective clothing, even though studies have found high 
radiation levels, including uranium, in these mines. This radiation can cause health problems such 
as anaemia, diabetes, kidney problems and infertility.  
 
The precarious security situation in the mines of KML is accentuated by the high rate of short-term 
contracts. In the mine of Kamoto, four out of ten miners do not have permanent contracts. 
Accordingly, they are less experienced and trained, which increases the risk of accidents.  
Thirdly, living conditions in villages around the mines: KML doesn’t implement a credible and 
systematic policy of dialogue with the communities situated around its mines. According to the 
field study, many village houses suffered damage (cracks as well as collapsed walls) as a result of 
regular blasting. In a letter to the leaders of the T17 mine, the residents of Moroni, a nearby village, 
pointed to such damages, but never received any response or compensation.  
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Another problem for communities living near the mines of KML concerns the pollution of streams 
and groundwater. The water pipes used for the mines are often in poor condition, therefore 
contaminated water regularly leaks out. Sometimes waste water is discharged directly into rivers, 
despite its high concentration of heavy metals, including uranium, of sulphur and of explosives 
residues.  
 
3. Maximum gain, minimal taxes  
 
In DRC, the mining tax revenues have shrunk in recent decades. While the mining sector accounted 
for 70% of total government revenues in the province of Katanga in the 80s, and for 30% in 2002, 
this percentage has dropped to 7% in 2006, despite the fact that mining production has increased 
significantly after the turmoil of civil war. This drop is mainly due to the many “tricks” mining 
companies use to evade taxes and duties: Examples are forged documents, illegal export of minerals 
or false information on quantities and concentrations of minerals. In addition, they also benefit from 
corruption within the administration. According to an investigation in 2007 by the Senate on the 
situation in the mining industry ("Rapport Mutamba"), the Congolese Treasury received only USD 
92 million out of USD 205 million actually owed.  
 
Glencore has a long and dark history in relationship with tax authorities. Let us recall the company's 
founder, Marc Rich, who already in 1983 was globally persecuted by US authorities because of tax 
fraud and trading with the enemy. Today, the headquarters of Glencore is situated in Baar, in the 
canton of Zug, in Switzerland, known for its low taxes. In addition, Glencore has several 
subsidiaries located in tax havens such as Bermuda Islands. This structure allows the group to shift 
profits and avoid taxes. In February 2011, the "system Glencore" attracted attention due to public 
investigations around the Zambian Mopani Copper Mine owned by Glencore. The major producer 
of copper and cobalt is accused of large-scale tax evasion.  
 
Katanga Mining Limited, a subsidiary of Glencore in the DRC, appears to have also adopted the 
“Glencore system”: KML has three subsidiaries situated respectively in Bermuda, Virgin Islands 
and the Isle of Man, which are all known as tax haven. Additionally, KML, which is on the way to 
become the largest copper producer in the DRC, will pay for the years 2010 to 2013 only a 
minimum annual tax of USD 1 million. This is nothing compared to the tax amounts paid by 
competitors such as First Quantum Minerals which is of similar size in respect to business activities 
but which paid USD 57 million in 2009.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
KML and Glencore emphasize in their documentation or on their web pages the importance of 
environmental protection in their activities and the principles of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Glencore highlights that its activities are guided by principles ("Glencore Corporate 
Practice") which include: "compliance with laws and human rights, environmental protection, 
promotion of employees’ health and safety, promotion of all business partners as well as of the 
surrounding communities and their welfare." Despite these commitments, action unfortunately is 
missing. As the field survey conducted by Bread for All, Catholic Lenten Fund and Bench Marks 
Foundation reveals, labour rights as well as the interests of local people and the surrounding 
communities are constantly violated in the context of Glencore’s investment in RDC.  
 
The finding is not surprising: Besides the rhetoric, Glencore hasn’t implemented credible corporate 
social responsibility policies. Glencore has so far made no serious effort to ensure that its subsidiary 
KML will comply with human rights and will minimize its environmental impact in the future. If 
Glencore applies as expected for listing on the stock market, a change in the corporate culture 
towards more transparency is necessary. However, the Swiss government must enact rules in order 
 8 
to assure that companies like Glencore have to be accountable for human rights violations, also 
concerning the activities of their foreign subsidiaries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Objectives of the study 
 
Switzerland hosts the largest number of transnational corporations in the world per inhabitant. 
Amongst these companies, there are well-known brands such as Nestlé, Novartis or Roche. There 
are also lesser-known companies active in the trading of raw materials. They are normally 
established in Geneva and Zug, two cities that have become main players in the world trade of raw 
materials. While Geneva mostly hosts societies active in the oil sector, Zug is the business centre of 
the mining industry’s products. These companies are active around the world and have an impact on 
the existence of thousands of people in Africa, Asia and Latin-America. 
 
In the context of their 2011 Annual Campaign, Bread for All and Action of Careme have chosen to 
examine one Swiss mining company, Glencore, to analyse the economic, social and environmental 
impact of its activities. Glencore, headquartered in Baar in the Swiss canton of Zug, is one of the 
biggest suppliers of raw materials in the world. Glencore is also the Swiss corporation with the 
highest business revenue – US$145 billion in 2010. This study analyses the strategies and 
commercial activities of Glencore in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). With the country's 
problematic human rights record, the DRC has become, despite its instability, a focus for privileged 
foreign investments from mining corporations from the west and, more recently, also from the 
Chinese. Glencore started investing in the province of Katanga (in the south of the DRC) in 2007. 
 
In the framework of this study, a desktop-research was undertaken in Switzerland. In addition, the 
Bench Marks Foundation, a partner organisation of Bread for All, has undertaken two survey 
missions in the field. As part of the field research (done in October 2010 and February 2011) the 
four researchers of the Bench Marks Foundation visited several mining sites. They met 
mineworkers, representatives of civil society as well as unions, governmental representatives, and 
members of the communities neighbouring the mines. The researchers also sent a detailed 
questionnaire to Glencore and its subsidiary in Congo – Katanga Mining Limited – but no reply was 
forthcoming at the time of the report being published, or after. 
 
1.2 The region: the province of Katanga in the DRC 
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Indicators of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
  
Gross Domestic Product US$300 per year and per inhabitant (in 2009, estimation) 
% of population living with less 
than 2 dollars per day 
84% 
Life expectancy 46/49 years (m/f) 
Infant mortality 1 infant out of 5 dies before reaching the age of 5 
Investment on health US$18 per inhabitant and per year 
Literacy 35% 
Average of school enrolment 3.8 years 
Underfed population 76% 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo has one of the richest subsoils in terms of mineral resources in 
the world. However, its population is still today one of the poorest on the planet. In 2010, the 
United Nations Development Programme classified the country as the second worst performing 
country on its Human Development Index (169
th
). 
 
The mines described in the report are located in Katanga, a province in the south-east of the DRC. 
The surface of Katanga is approximately 496'877 km
2
, which is close to 12 times Switzerland's 
surface. Around 9 million people live in the region, where resources come mostly from agriculture 
and mining. Katanga hosts 34% of the world reserves of cobalt and 10% of the world reserves of 
copper, and is located in the so-called Copperbelt of Central Africa, which goes through Zambia and 
DRC. 
 
Located in the southern part of Katanga, the village of Kolwezi is surrounded by the mines included 
in this study. This village was founded in 1937 to host the headquarters of the Belgian Union 
minière du Haut Katanga which, following nationalisation back in 1967, became the Générale des 
carrières et des mines (Gécamines), a state mining company. Once called in the 70s “the lung of the 
congolese economy” because of Gécamines’ intense production, Kolwezi is today a village marked 
by recession, unemployment and poverty. The recession started at the end of the 90s, when financial 
and managerial hardships forced Gécamines to close down almost 90% of its production. In 2003, 
massive layoffs undertaken by the company in the framework of a privatisation programme (more 
than 10 600 workers were retrenched) aggravated the crisis and pushed many mineworkers into 
severe poverty.  
 
Nowadays, two types of mining exploitation take place in Kolwezi: artisanal mining and industrial 
mining. Artisan miners work in the old concessions of Gécamines, sometimes with their bare hands. 
They are tolerated by local authorities, who do not have other activities to suggest to the poor 
miners. Their situation, however, remains precarious: if any concession is reclaimed by private 
investors, police will chase them away, not hesitating to use violence. Industrial mines are in the 
hands of foreign multinational corporations that have reclaimed old concessions of Gécamines 
privatised between 1997 and 2005. These new joint ventures today export the essential minerals of 
Katanga. The interaction between artisanal and industrial mining is characterised by trade 
exchanges and social tensions. 
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2. Glencore in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
2.1 The international headquarters: Glencore International AG 
 
A history of controversy 
 
Glencore International is one of the world's largest suppliers and traders of raw materials. The 
company was created in 1974 by Marc Rich, a controversial businessman listed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as amongst the most wanted white-collar criminals. At the end of the 
1970s, Marc Rich had built his fortune by bypassing the American embargo on Iran to sell oil to the 
Ayatollah Khomeini. A few years later, he also sold gold to the South African Apartheid regime, 
despite the UN embargo. For these actions he was wanted in 1983 by the American justice system 
where he is accused of more than 50 charges (tax evasion of more than US$48 million, trading with 
the enemy, etc.). Theses charges, if convicted, would translate into more than 300 years in prison. 
Marc Rich then sought refuge in Switzerland and established the headquarters of his company in 
Zug. The Swiss government, thereafter, would always refuse to extradite him. 
 
In 1994, Marc Rich passed on the management of Glencore International to his deputy, Willy 
Strothotte, who held the position of executive director for 8 years and today still heads its board of 
directors. Willy Strothotte is one of the main stakeholders at Glencore. With a fortune of more than 
3 billion Swiss francs (2008), he is part of “the 20 patrons that make up Switzerland”. Since 2002, 
Ivan Glasenberg took over the executive direction of the company. Glasenberg was also part of the 
close circle of Marc Rich. He worked at Glencore since 1989, in the post of head of the carbon 
sector since 1991, before becoming director of the international headquarters in 2002. 
 
Since Strothotte and Glasenberg took the reins of Glencore, the reputation of the company, however, 
has not improved much as the following examples show. In 2004, the Nigerian government accused 
Glencore of fixing its taxes. In 2005, it was accused of bypassing the embargo against Iraq and of 
having bought oil from Saddam Hussein. According to a CIA report, Glencore paid more than US$3 
million of surcharges to Saddam Hussein for the petroleum. In 2007, the Bolivian government 
decided to take over one of the tin mines managed by the Swiss multinational, accusing Glencore of 
having under-paid for exploitation rights. Finally, a partner of Glencore was under investigation in 
Russia back in 2008 for “illegal commercial activities”. 
 
Today, Glencore International AG has more than 50 offices in about forty different countries, 
employing more than 2 700 people. The corporation also manages, directly or indirectly, mining 
exploitations in 30 countries, employing about 55 000 people. Finally, Glencore has important 
shares, some majorities, in many stock market listed companies, especially: Xstrata Plc, Century 
Aluminium, Katanga Mining, Minara Resources, Chemoil Energy, Recyclex and UCR. 
 
Glencore is the company with the largest revenue in Switzerland, which in 2010, amounted to 
US$145 billion. The total of their assets amounts to US$79,8 billion and the funds of its employees 
are US$19,6 billion. Yet Glencore is not listed in the stock market and the financial information 
given by the company is extremely brief, and incomplete. 
 
In the beginning, Glencore focused its activities in the trading of metals, minerals and oil. During 
the 1980s, the company started to diversify its activities and invested in agricultural products – it 
acquired in particular a Dutch company active in the grain market. Since the 1990s, the company 
also started buying shares in the extraction, production, refining and smelting industries. During the 
last few years, and particularly under Glasenberg’s reign, Glencore has increased its control over the 
whole production process. Through its investments in various companies of the mining sector, the 
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company acquires minerals from key mining areas of the world in a manner that may be considered 
monopolistic. Its investments in Africa, in particular in Zambia with the Mopani Copper Mine, and 
more recently in the DRC with Katanga Mining Limited, are part of the strategy to control the 
whole of the production chain.  
 
Today Glencore is one of the largest suppliers of raw materials in the world. The company resells 
the products to customers in the motor, steel, electronic and energy industries or even in the food 
processing industry. 
 
A “family” culture 
 
The company culture at Glencore is one of ambition – it comprises an elite group of managers and 
officers, considered as being amongst the best in the world. Their staff is young, competent, 
intelligent and work at 200% and “they have a culture that does not tolerate mediocrity”, according 
to Bloomberg. Whenever a post becomes vacant, even at the higher echelons of management, 
Glencore rarely opens it to outsiders, preferring generally to employ from within. At the managerial 
level, the directors go from one board of directors within the group to another. Willy Strothotte, for 
instance (president of the board of directors of Glencore International AG), is also president of the 
board of directors of Xstrata. Even the executive director of Glencore International AG, Ivan 
Glasenberg, is also a member of the board of directors of Minara Resources, a company in Australia 
where Glencore has invested. 
 
Loyalty is another value of the Glencore company culture. This loyalty is guaranteed by the prestige 
of working in one of the largest transnational corporations in the world, but equally by its particular 
system of rewards. Since the company is not (yet) listed on the stock market, it belongs to the 
employees. In particular, the Swiss company invests the majority of its profits in a fund that is then 
redistributed to (some of) its employees. The 12 top directors owned 31% of the profits of the 
shareholders fund, which was worth US$16.7 billion, at the end of 2009. The other owners (around 
435) share the rest of the cake. “If they left the company today, each of these top directors would 
take home an average fortune of US$325 million. The other executives (also owners) would receive 
an average of US$20 million. The employees still receive benefits up to 5 years after leaving the 
company,” wrote a Bloomberg journalist. 
 
2.2 Glencore’s subsidiary in the DRC: Katanga Mining Limited (KML) 
 
A subsidiary of Glencore in the DRC is Katanga Mining Limited (KML). The headquarters of KML 
are in Bermuda. Yet the corporation exploits six mining areas in the region of Katanga, in the DRC, 
through two joint ventures: the Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) and the DRC Copper and Cobalt 
Project (DCP). These two joint ventures were amalgamated into one through an agreement on July 
25, 2009. 
 
The exploitation rights of KML cover six different mining areas of copper and cobalt. The mining 
areas are located over a territory of more than 40 km
2
, which is the size of the canton of Geneva 
(see the map below). They represent a total amount of 16 million tons of copper. The copper 
extracted from the subsoil of Katanga and the territories exploited by KML is of good quality: its 
density is of 3% to 5%. In comparison, the minerals extracted in Chile, for long considered the main 
world producer of copper, have a density average of only 1%. 
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Map of mining areas of KML. Copyright: D.Tillmanns. 
 
 
KML’s mines and deposits  
 
The joint venture agreement between Gécamines and KML also included the use by the latter of a 
number of plants and industrial goods that used to belong to Gécamines. This is the case of the 
Kamoto concentrator and of the hydrometallurgical plant of Luili. These infrastructures play an 
extremely important role as with them, KML concentrates its minerals. As a matter of fact, the 
minerals extracted from the mines are only a mixture of minerals. Thus before transporting and 
exporting these minerals, it is necessary (as well as profitable) for them to undergo certain 
treatment. 
 
The concentrator of Kamoto undertakes a first step in the treatment of the minerals through 
operations involving its crushing, sieving, grinding and selecting. The process also involves floating 
the minerals in the water, followed by decantation which leads to the separation of the silt and 
residues from the richest part of the mineral. 
 
 
www.katangamining.com 
 
The Luili Metallurgical Plant undertakes the second step in the purification of the minerals. Using a 
concentration of copper (25% to 40%), it leads, through successive phases, to the cathodes. The 
copper plates obtained are almost pure (99%).  
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www.katangamining.com 
 
From the mines to the processing plants, KML has the means to control the whole cycle of the 
production of copper.  
 
The largest producer of copper in Africa 
 
Due to the rehabilitation of certain mines and infrastructures, the capacity of production of KML 
has not achieved its full potential. In 2009 - 2010 for instance, it was necessary to undertake several 
repairs in order to subtract water accumulated in an open pit mine in Kov. This was necessary so 
that extracting activities could be restarted, given that the reserves of that mining area were 
estimated to be approximately 15 million tons of copper. The potential is thus huge. 
 
In 2010, KML produced almost 60 000 tons of copper and almost 3 500 tons of cobalt.  
 
The company has the goal to become, by 2015, the largest producer of copper in Africa as well as 
the largest producer of cobalt in the world, with 310 000 tons of copper per year and 30 000 tons of 
cobalt per year. 
 
 
Open pit mine T-17 Musonoi 
Copyright: Katanga Mining 
 
2.3 Glencore and Katanga Mining Limited: the tentacles of the empire 
 
Glencore’s strategy 
 
In a poll conducted on the networks of the founder of Glencore, Marc Rich, Business Week's 
journalists described in 2005 the economic strategy of Rich and his successors as follows: “The 
tactics of the “Rich Boys” are aggressive, but generally they are also perfectly legal. One of their 
investment strategies is to use the opportunities on offer by the East European countries and 
developing countries while these are in great need of financing capacity. Rich teaches his disciples – 
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called lehrling (“learners” in German) his strategy – to lend money to battered companies, so as to 
secure a quick right of purchase of their raw materials.” 
 
In the DRC, Ivan Glasenberg applied this strategy to the letter. Between 2007 and July 2009, at the 
height of a world financial crisis, Glencore slowly took an almost absolute control of the largest 
reserves of copper and minerals in the world. In less than three years, it bought out almost the whole 
of Katanga Mining Limited. With this investment, Glencore managed to diversify its suppliers of 
raw materials and thus increase its presence in the global market of copper and cobalt. 
 
Glencore and KML: Summary of important facts and dates 
 
 EVENTS 
November 2007 Glencore Finance offers a first loan close to US$150 million to KML. At the 
same time, KML and Glencore reach a commercial agreement which allows the 
latter to buy, during six years, the 100% of the production of copper and cobalt in 
Katanga Copper Company (KCC). 
October 2008 Glencore nominates the new ad interim director at KML: Steven Isaacs, finance 
director at Glencore International. He is seconded by Tim Henderson, executive 
director for Africa at Glencore International.  
January 2009 Glencore lends US$265 million to KML as convertible and non convertible 
debts. Such loan entails: 
- The prolongation of the first loan of 150 million dollars back in 2007, 
whose value has now increased and with the interests is now worth 
US$165.3 million. 
- A new loan of US$100 million.  
Simultaneously, KML and Glencore reach a new commercial agreement that will 
allow the latter to buy during ten years the 100% of the production of copper and 
cobalt of KML (that is, the mines of KCC and DCP).  
April 2009 Glencore offers a new loan of approximately US$50 million to KML, non 
convertible, and repayable in December 31, 2009. 
Between 
February and 
July 2009 
Glencore becomes majority shareholder at KML, with 77% of the shares. In 
October, Glencore will resell some of these shares and establish its participation 
with 74.4% of the shares. 
 
KML at the height of the financial crisis 
 
Glencore invests for the first time in KML in November 2007. At the time, the economy in Katanga 
gets going again thanks to the rise in the price of copper on the international markets. A ton of 
copper is sold then for more than US$7 000, given the sudden rise in the demand of raw materials in 
China and India. The second investment of Glencore arrives at the end of 2008, at the height of the 
financial crisis. In one year, the context has radically changed: the prices have fallen 60% and a ton 
of copper is sold for US$2 800. In Katanga, the situation is worrying as in only a few months, more 
than 40 mining companies have closed their doors and several foreign investors, especially the 
Chinese investors, packed their bags and left. An observer pointed out: “When Katanga coughs, the 
international market of copper sneezes... With the financial crisis, the contrary has happened – the 
mineworker in Katanga has sneezed, agonizingly.”  
 
During this period, KML also experienced difficulties. In November 2008, given the weak price of 
cobalt, the company had to stop the exploitation of its cobalt mine in Tilwenzembe and suspend 
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mining at the concentrator in Kolwezi. The situation looked even bleaker for KML, as it had 
undertaken during the year several financial investments to repair some infrastructures. In addition, 
it undertook a series of repairs and investments which sought to improve the performance of the 
concentrator Kamoto, so as to increase the volume of minerals extracted there. Finally, the ongoing 
merger of the joint venture agreements of Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) and DRC Copper and 
Cobalt Project (DCP) meant that the company needed to increase from 1 to 100 million dollars its 
capital stock. In the autumn of 2008, KML was in urgent need of cash, which gave Glencore 
International the opportunity to offer to KML the necessary life saving measures and thus allow for 
the recapitalisation of the company.  
 
The economic take-over by Glencore 
 
As the Swiss company points out on its website, Glencore has invested now for several years in 
other companies active in the extraction of raw materials: “The strategic investment of Glencore in 
industrial goods is an important part of the activities through which Glencore acquires and trades 
with raw materials. Such investments are also seen as a way to diversify risks.” 
 
The first loan of US$150 million by Glencore to Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) in 2007 clearly 
illustrates this approach. The loan came along with a commercial agreement, which allowed 
Glencore to buy 100% of KCC's copper produced during six years.  
 
In 2008, while KCC and DCP were working on a merger agreement, Glencore looked after its 
interests and nominated the interim directors at KML, following the resignation of the old CEO, 
Arthur Ditto. The new interim director, Steven Isaacs, was at the time a top executive at Glencore 
International for 14 years. He was then still finance director at the mother company. Before taking 
the post as director of KML, he had chaired a working group responsible for the acquisition and 
development by Glencore of the mines of Mopani in Zambia. His assistant, Tim Henderson, was the 
executive director for the Africa region at Glencore International. At the end of 2008, while KML 
was facing acute financial difficulties, the interim directors signed a loan of US$100 million with 
the Swiss company.  
 
Thanks to the loan, Glencore International took the control over KML: 
 
 Confirming a commercial agreement which allowed them to buy during ten years 100% of 
all copper and cobalt extracted from the concessions of KML. Through this agreement, 
Glencore secured the exclusive provision, short of saying monopolistic, from six key mining 
areas of Katanga. 
 Becoming the majority shareholder at KML, with 74.4% of the shares. This allowed them to 
maintain long term control over KML.  
 
The conditions under which Glencore took control of KML defy the norm. Given the financial 
crisis, the fall in the price of copper and cobalt and in the sources of cash, the shares of KML lost 
97% of their value in the stock market in only six months. When the loan of Glencore to KML was 
converted into shares, between February 2009 and July 2009, the value of KML was at its lowest: 
one share that was worth more than US$16 in 2007 was then not worth more than 27 cents 
(US$0.27). In exchange of a loan of less than US$500 million, Glencore acquired 74.4% of the 
share of a company that is today worth US$3.2 billion. 
 
Glencore’s influence on the management of KML 
 
Glencore has a decisive influence at the heart of the board of directors of KML. Out of eight 
members of the board of directors, four are employees, or former employees, of Glencore 
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International or of a company associated to Glencore: 
 
 Steven Isaacs, mentioned above, was the interim director of KML from October 2008 to 
December 2009. He was a director at Glencore International for 14 years. 
 Cornelius Erasmus is also a director of Glencore International AG. He is on the board of 
directors of KML since November 2009. He is also a member of the board of directors of 
the copper mines of Mopani in Zambia. 
 Aristotelis Mistakidis is a director at Glencore International since 1993, who then become 
part of the board of directors of KML since January 2008. He is also president of the board 
of directors of the copper mines of Mopani in Zambia, and is also member of the board of 
directors of Recyclex SA (Anciennement Metaleurop SA). 
 John Ross is the new executive director of KML since January 2010. Before taking on the 
directorship of the company in the DRC, he worked for eight years for companies linked to 
Glencore, and in particular for the copper mine of Mopani, and for the Mutanda and 
Mukonkota mine in the DRC. Before joining KML, he worked for Mopani Copper Mines, 
where he was a project manager.  
 
Today, Glencore's remarkable control over KML is considered a risk factor, even in the official 
reports by KML: “Glencore and its subsidiaries own 74.4% of the shares of Katanga Mining 
Limited. In addition, two of the members of the board of directors, Mr. Mistakidis and Mr. Erasmus, 
are currently employed by Glencore. Since Glencore actually has the majority control at KML as 
well as links with two members of the board of directors, its position allows for a significant 
influence over the decisions taken at KML, in particular when approving shareholders. The control 
by Glencore could in fact prevent or slow down any changes in the ownership of KML, or could 
even hold back decisions by the director or board of directors, something that would conflict with 
the interests of other shareholders and, in consequence, have a negative impact on the course of 
shares of Katanga.” 
 
 
Open pit mine T-17 Copyright: Katanga Mining 
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3. Contracts, human rights, environment and taxes: the negative 
balance sheet of Glencore 
 
3.1 The allocation of rights: the looting of resources in the DRC 
 
The activities of KML in the region of Kolwezi are based on the mining rights acquired in a non-
transparent process at the end of the war, in 2004 and 2005. Despite a long process of re-negotiating 
the mining contracts led by the Congolese government between 2007 and 2009, the terms of the 
concessions of KML did not change much. It fundamentally remains the same today: the contracts 
systematically favour the interests of private investors. And the people of Katanga have not had 
many opportunities to see improvement in their living conditions, despite the large profits made by 
Glencore's subsidiaries. 
 
 
Site in Gécamines 
 
Corruption and non-transparent negotiations 
 
According to the Congolese Mining Code, which was drawn up in 2002 with the support of the 
World Bank, the privatisation of the public company, Gécamines, must be done through an open 
and transparent tender. In fact, Article 33 of the Code specifies that for all mining areas whose 
reserves are of public interest, and its value has been proved, researched, or even started to exploit, 
the allocation must follow a public invitation to tender, based on a reliable and independent 
evaluation on the value of the commodities to be privatised.
2
 In the case of the exploitation rights of 
the mines of KML, none of the above clauses were respected.  
 
At the time, KML did not exist in its current form. The six mining areas exploited today by 
Glencore's subsidiaries (in particular Kamoto and KOV) were the subject, in 2005, of two separate 
joint venture agreements between Gécamines and Belgian (Kinross Forrest) and Canadian (Global 
Enterprise Corporate) investors. These two agreements later turned into one under the direction of 
KML in 2009.  
 
                                               
2 See Law N0 007/2002 of 11 July supporting the mining code, article 3 : «L’appel d’offres est conclu dans un délai 
d’un an à compter de l’entrée en vigueur de l’Arrêté portant réservation du gisement à soumettre à l’appel d’offres. 
L’appel d’offres, précisant les termes et conditions des offres ainsi que la date et l’adresse auxquels les offres 
devront être déposées, est publié au Journal Officiel. Il peut également être publié dans les journaux locaux et 
internationaux spécialisés. Les offres déposées conformément aux termes et conditions de l’appel d’offres sont 
examinées promptement par une Commission Interministérielle dont les membres sont nommés et convoqués par le 
Ministre afin de sélectionner la meilleure offre sur la base de :a) programme des opérations proposées et des 
engagements des dépenses financières y afférentes ; b) ressources financières et techniques disponibles de l’offrant ; 
c) l’expérience antérieure de l’offrant dans la conduite des opérations proposées ; d) divers autres avantages 
socioéconomiques pour l’Etat, la province et la communauté environnante, y compris le bonus de signature offert. » 
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History of the rights of KCC and DCP 
 
 
 
These two agreements were extensively documented and widely criticized in particular for the non-
transparent process in which the rights were allocated. In the case of the mines of Kamoto, for 
instance, the negotiations between Kinross Forrest (KFL) and the public company Gécamines 
started in 2001. The director of KFL, the Belgian financier Georges Forrest, was then an important 
financial contributor of Joseph Kabila's political party;
3
 as such, he enjoyed privileged relations 
with the Congolese elite.
4
 When the negotiations with Kinross Forrest started, Georges Forrest was 
also the president of the board of directors of Gécamines, a job provided to him by Kabila and 
where he served from 1999 to 2001. This obvious conflict of interest, however, did not stop him 
from leading the negotiations.  
 
From 2001 to 2005, several Congolese as well as international actors (see Charter below) 
denounced as unacceptable the contract proposed by KFL to Gécamines, which gave to the latter 
the exploitation rights to the mining areas of Kamoto and for the use of the plants attached to it. But 
this outcry was useless. The agreement was ratified by presidential decree in August 2005. The birth 
of Kamoto Copper Company was thus stained with corruption and collusion involving the networks 
of the Congolese elite. The company subsequently changed its name to Katanga Mining Limited in 
November 2005.
5
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 “ L'Etat contre le peuple, la gouvernance, l'exploitation minière et le régime transitoire en République démocratique 
du Congo”, Fatal Transaction, 2006, page 46. 
4 “Congo Siasa. The Richest Man in the Congo?” J.Sterns, 2010. 
5 See www.katangamining.com/kat/about_us/history 
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Kamoto Copper Company: warnings against a biased contract 
 
Date Event 
2001 After announcing the negotiations between Kinross Forrest and Gécamines, the 
Minister of Mining, Simon Tuma-Waku, sent a report to President Kabila, where 
in his conclusion he pointed out the unfair and disadvantaged terms and 
conditions of the contract to the Congolese people that weighed heavily in 
favour of Kinross Forrest.  
September 2003 An independent English company, International Mining Consultants (IMC) 
confirmed the conclusions of that report. Based on an audit by the World Bank, 
IMC presented to the Congolese authorities a plan of action to reform 
Gécamines. In this context, IMC recommended the immediate suspension of the 
negotiations between KFL and Gécamines and that the idea of a joint venture be 
abandoned. The IMC also recommended the dismissal of all Gécamines 
directors. 
November 2003 Following IMC's report, the Chief of Staff to the Presidency (Kabila) sent a letter 
to the director of Gécamines, demanding that they end all negotiations with 
Kinross Forrest as well as those involving the mines of Kamoto, Dima and the 
Luilu plants. 
February 2004 The director and the president of Gécamines signed in February 2004 a joint 
venture agreement with Kinross Forrest. 
June 2005 The Lutundula Commission, in charge of evaluating mining contracts settled 
during the war, submitted a report to the National Assembly which 
recommended the suspension of the joint venture agreement with Kinross 
Forrest. Two months later, the contract was accepted via presidential decree. 
 
Congolese contributions undervalued 
 
Several observers denounced the joint venture agreement between Gécamines and Kinross Forrest 
because of the terms of the contract, which were obviously unfavourable to the Congolese. The 
commodities brought in by Gécamines to the joint venture agreement were systematically 
undervalued. As a result, the Congolese natural resources are cheaply sold with an agreement 
offering 75% of the dividends to the Belgian investor and 25% of the dividends to the Congolese 
investor. 
 
The assets brought in by Gécamines to the joint venture: 
 
 The reserves of the mining area of Kamoto have proved to be 15.9 million tons of 
copper and of almost one million tons of cobalt. In 2005, the price of one ton of copper 
fluctuated between US$3 000 and US$4 000. The value of the Kamoto reserves is thus 
worth several billion dollars.
6
 
 The plants of Kamoto and Luilu, allowing for the processing of minerals, have residual 
value which is considerable.  
 
The assets contributed by Kinross Forrest are: 
 
 US$200 million as key money, or goodwill in South African language (but basically is 
                                               
6 In comparaison, the value of the reserves attributed to China in 2008, that is, 10 million tons of copper and 200 000 
tons of cobalt, was estimated to be more than 9 billion dollars. 
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defined as payment made by a potential tenant in an attempt to secure a desired tenancy). 
 Loans that will allow for the finance of investments to re-launch the production. 
According to the agreement, these loans will be entirely reimbursed by the joint venture. 
 The expertise to conduct mining operations. 
 
Given the assets that each of the partners bring in, it is difficult to understand the 25% shares agreed 
to by Gécamines: it should have been 50%, at least. At the end of the day, this will result in 
Gécamines only being able to receive 25% of the dividends or benefits of the joint venture. 
 
The process of reviewing the mining contracts, led by the Congolese government from 2007 to 
2009, yielded little change. The contracts of the Katanga Mining Limited (that is, of the Kamoto 
Copper Company (KCC) and the DRC Copper and Cobalt Project) were part of the contracts 
reviewed and evaluated by the board of enquiry and were found to be non-viable and non-
acceptable in their present state.
7
 However, these discussions between the government and the 
private corporations, party to the renegotiation of the contract, too did not lead to any change. 
Today, the distribution of the dividends between Gécamines and KML is still of 25% and 75%.
8
 
This means that the subsidiary of Glencore has the right to exploit one of the richest subsoils in the 
planet without having to give back a substantial part of the benefits to the Congolese state.  
 
To put this into context, it is important to point out a recent contract between the People's Republic 
of China and the DRC, which sparked a lot of anger in Europe. The contract establishes conditions 
that are a lot more favourable to the DRC. Firstly, the Chinese part takes 68% of the dividends, 
leaving 32% of them to the Congolese counterpart: thus China clearly takes less than Western 
investors in other contracts. Secondly, in exchange for the access to the reserves (worth 10 million 
tons of copper and 200 000 tons of cobalt), China committed to undertake important infrastructure 
development projects, such as: 3 000 km of roads, as many railroads, 31 hospitals with 150 beds 
each, 145 health centres, and even universities! The infrastructural projects are said to be worth 
US$6.5 billion.
9
 With Glencore's investments, the conditions are not at all close to the above. The 
subsidiary of the Swiss corporation uses the limited electricity of the country and the precarious 
routes of the Katanga province and pollutes the air of the region, without any compensation or any 
real contribution to the development of the region.  
 
A mining sector that does not benefit people 
 
Katanga Mining Limited is not the only foreign company in the DRC that acquired licenses that 
have been shrouded in controversy. The mining areas and plants currently exploited by KML 
account for more than 50% of the assets of Gécamines.  
 
                                               
7 See “ Révision des contrats miniers and RDC. Rapports sur 12 contrats miniers”, CEPAS, novembre 2007. Also see 
the speech of the legal adviser on mines Valery Mukasa in “Rapport de l'atelier sur l'évaluation du processus de 
revisitation et de renégociation des contrats miniers tenus au CEPAS, le 14 décembre 2009 ”, pp.4-7. 
8 The negotiations between the government and the private actors on the contracts of KCC and DCP have not been 
made accessible to the public, despite repeated demands from the Congolese civil society. The reports of Katanga 
Mining Limited, however, shed some light on the overall conclusions: (a) the distribution of the dividends is still of 
25% and 75%, (b) KML will have to pay extra hey money, that is, 104 million dollars to Gécamines, and (c) the 
royalties paid for using industrial commodities as well as for the exhaustion of reserves will increase from 1.5% to 
2.5%. See “A Technical Report on the Material Assets of Katanga Mining Limited Katanga Province, DRC”, Tim 
Henderson, 31 March 2010, pp. 4-13. 
9 The contract signed with China also raises a few questions, in particular when it comes to tax exemptions, yet still 
the overall conditions are way superior to those contained in contracts signed with Western companies. Especially 
given the fact that Western corporations base their headquarters in tax havens in order to avoid paying taxes in DRC: 
see “DRC: les contrats chinois en 7 questions”, by Congotribune, 24 May 2008. Or “RD Congo le contrat minier 
chinois divise”, by Hanse Guye, Les Afriques, or even “Le contrat du siècle”, Christian Colomba, Monde 
Diplomatique, February 2011. 
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Historically, it is important to note that Gécamines, under state hands, was amongst the world's top 
five largest producers of copper and cobalt. During the 1970s and 1980s, the company's turnover 
represented up to 70% of the Congolese budget and guaranteed approximately 33 000 jobs in 
Katanga. The company's dynamism to the provincial economy represented then a real plus value for 
the inhabitants of the region of Kolwezi. Gécamines employed large sections of the local 
population, built up roads, supplied the water and electricity provisions, contributed to the 
maintenance of schools and hospitals, and even put in place centres for the provision of food in the 
neighbouring regions. The hospitals or health centres of Gécamines were not exclusive for the 
company workers, but welcomed patients from neighbouring communities. The general hospital 
Jason Sendwe, for example, received annually up to a million patients who were not linked to 
Gécamines.
10
 That is how, until the beginning of the 1990s, the region of Kolwezi represented “an 
island of development” as reflecting the country's highest rates of schooling, access to water as well 
as electricity. 
 
Currently, the situation has completely changed: towns in the Katanga province are in a disastrous 
condition. The town of Kolwezi lacks basic infrastructure including drinking water, and access to 
food. The majority of the 500 000 inhabitants have no access to electricity and resort to charcoal for 
heating purposes, leading to serious problems of pollution and destruction of the neighbouring 
forests. Whilst the roads to the mines are always well-maintained, those in towns cry out for urgent 
rehabilitation. They are full of potholes, causing severe havoc particularly when it rains. The health 
situation in Kolwezi is also a cause for pain: there is only one doctor for every 100 000 inhabitants, 
which is one of the lowest rates in the African continent.
11
 Finally, the social indicators have also 
dramatically dropped: the school enrolment rate now stands at 46%, which is 10% under the 
national average (56%). 
 
In this precarious context, Katanga Mining Limited manages certain social programmes, but they 
are mostly anecdotal, and difficult to verify. What is clear, however, is that there is no global vision, 
nor a significant contribution to the development of the region. Health-wise, for instance, Katanga 
Copper has opened a health centre on the outskirts but, as it appears, only the company's workers 
have access to it. The quality of it is also not up to scratch, as field researchers confirm that, “even 
the workers of Katanga Copper would rather go for treatment to public hospitals, as they are not 
happy with the services offered at the company's health centre.”12 
 
3.2 Human rights: repeated abuse 
 
In economic terms, the activities of Glencore's subsidiary in Katanga are based on contracts that 
constitute a form of looting of the region's resources. And what about the social policies of KML? 
Do they benefit the population and respect the rights of the workers of Kolwezi? The field 
researchers sent by the Bench Marks Foundation, Bread for All and Action de Careme, found 
Glencore’s subsidiary to be little concerned with its social and environmental responsibility. They 
further found problems in three areas: violation of human rights and child labour in the artisanal 
mines from which KML buys its minerals; labour rights abuses in the KCC mines owned by KML; 
and environmental damage done to communities neighbouring the mines. 
 
 
 
                                               
10 Press conference by Jean-Pierre Mutemba, in “Révision des contrats miniers en RDC. Rapports sur 12 contrats 
 miniers”, CEPAS, November 2007, p. 128. 
11 “Corporate Social Responsibility and the Supply Chain in the Copper – Cobalt Mining Industry in Katanga : 
Glencore, Kolwezi”, Freek Cronje, Jean-Didier Losambo Nzinga adn David van Dick on the behalf of the Bench 
Marks Foundation, Bread for All and the Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund, December 2010, p. 50. 
12 Idem, p. 50. 
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KML, Glencore and the artisanal sector 
 
In Katanga, there are approximately 150 000 artisanal miners, of which 30 000 live in the region of 
Kolwezi. Considering that one miner feeds approximately five persons, the number of inhabitants 
that depend on artisanal mining extraction in Kolwezi is estimated to be approximately 750 000 
people. 
 
The mining code adopted back in 2002
13
 grants the right to work in an artisanal mine to any 
Congolese citizen that applies for it. Following the waves of retrenchments that affected Gécamines 
between 2002 and 2005, a large number of miners of Gécamines turned to artisanal mining to earn a 
living. In the main, the government is mandated to identify and define specific zones for the 
exploitation by artisanal miners. Each miner should be registered and obtain an identity card. On the 
practical side, however, artisanal exploitation is a bit restricted. The technical services lack the 
means for law enforcement, the buyers and the middlemen trade illegally, and artisanal miners are 
not aware of their rights. As a result, almost the majority of artisanal exploitation takes place outside 
of the law.
14
 In addition, the living and labour conditions of artisanal miners in Katanga are 
extremely poor and sub-standard. 
 
Glencore's subsidiary has bought a large quantity of minerals from the artisanal subsidiaries, 
according to several witnesses whom field research spoke to.
15
 These minerals are an extremely 
good business for big corporations. Glencore's subsidiary does not get the copper and cobalt directly 
from the miners but rather they work with negociants, which act as intermediaries between the 
artisanal miners and some of the trading houses. The negociants are located in town, and in this 
case, in Kolwezi, where their service is in great demand. Certain companies even go so as far as 
offering loans to negociants to help them establish their “businesses”. They, in return, are expected 
to deliver their minerals to their creditors, i.e. the companies which gave them their loans, at prices 
lower than real market rates. Various different sources, including the Bench Marks Foundation 
researchers, who interviewed the negociants in Kolwezi,
16
 alleged that KML supply chains are:  
 
 The negociants' trading houses, which are mostly Lebanese and Pakistani owned. They 
buy minerals extracted from the Quarry Basin of Luili and the concessions of 
Tilwezembe, 30km away from Kolwezi. Both concessions belong to Katanga Mining 
Limited. 
 Two trading houses, Bazanu and Isamael, who buy minerals from the area of 
Tilwezembe and another called Mutanda Mining. 
 
These minerals are partly refined in the concentration plants of KML and integrated in KML's 
official channels for processing and exporting. It is most probable that a part of these artisanal 
minerals are also exported in a non-concentrated form to Zambia, and that they are not declared, 
since they are not recorded in the official statistics of production and exportation.  
 
Working conditions in artisanal mines: a dire situation 
 
The working conditions in artisanal mines are disastrous. The miners dig holes and tunnels, mostly 
with bare hands and with no safety equipment. They have no ladder to go down the mines, which 
sometimes are 40 metres deep. They go down alongside the rubble, risking injury every time. Inside 
the tunnels, the miners use flashlights or candles to see. In that semi-darkness, they work the soil to 
                                               
13 See “Loi no 007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant code minier. Titre IV de l’exploitation artisanale des mines” 
14 “Exploitation minière artisanale en RDC”, Etude Promine, Pact, June 2010 
15 In particular negociants, union members and civil society representatives in Kolwezi.  
16 The Bench Marks Foundation researchers interviewed negociants of Kolwezi, civil society representatives of 
Kolwezi, as well as people close to the Kamoto Copper Company.  
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bring minerals to the surface. In the mines, accidents are frequent. Yet miners are often not able to 
pay their medical bills, as they have no medical aid or social protection of any kind. 
 
In terms of health, artisanal miners further face less visible dangers: according to a study by Pact 
Congo,
17
 most of the areas surrounding Kolwezi present radioactivity levels harmful to human 
health. In addition, the groundwater and water of surrounding rivers contains heavy metals as well 
as uranium. 
 
These artisanal mines look like anthills with dozens of miners relentlessly working until dawn. 
Amongst the miners are children who are small and agile and able to squeeze in certain holes or 
narrow gullies. They are also employed around the mines, along with the women, to clean the 
minerals or to carry bags as heavy as 20 kilograms. According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)
18
 30 000 children are working in the mines in Katanga. These children, because 
of poverty, are forced to leave school to contribute to the family income. A whole generation is 
growing up in the violent reality of the sandpits. Beyond the physical consequences that these jobs 
generally entail – injuries linked to accidents or to the heavy bags they carry – there are social 
consequences and millions of children have no other future. 
 
 
Child labour in a copper mine in Katanga  
Copyright: Guilda Elmaguado 
 
During field research, the Bench Marks Foundation researchers observed many women and children 
around the mines of Kamoto, T17 and KOV, mines owned by KML. They also observed women 
and children by the mines of Tilwenzembe and the Basin of Luilu. According to a woman 
interviewed, they work 7 hours in the morning and 5 hours in the afternoon, for a salary of 1 000 
Congolese francs per day (1 dollar). The women often suffer from kidney failure and 
ophthalmological problems. They are often witnesses of, as well as victims of sexual harassment.  
 
Laughable wages 
 
The salaries of artisanal miners depend on the prices set by negociants, which are often very low. 
                                               
17 “Report on Health Problems potentially linked to Exposure to Radio Active Substances in Kolwezi”, Pact Congo, 
2010. 
18 2006 statistics.  
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The abundance of labourers, the lack of unions and the ignorance of the market make it difficult for 
the diggers to lead a real negotiation on prices. Diggers can get paid an average of US$3 to US$5 a 
day for their work. They can get US$30 on their best days. Negociants earn better, but they are 
under the pressure of companies, such as KML, to sell at a cheaper rate. In October 2010, for 
instance, commercial companies would buy a ton of cobalt for US$1 000, its concentration being of 
8%. The profit margins made by big corporations are thus very large. 
 
A road paved with corruption 
 
Corruption is another difficulty artisanal miners face. The majority of artisanal miners have no 
identity card, their status is thus illegal. And so they are quite vulnerable to the pressure coming 
from the police and official bodies. The corruption is extremely well organised and present in every 
phase of the process of extraction. It starts literally at the entering point of each mine, around the 
check points defining the exploitation areas, and even alongside each road leading to Kolwezi. In 
total, the bribes demanded by all those intermediaries add to a considerable amount. When the 
Bench Marks Foundation researchers visited the artisanal mines of the Basin of Luilu, owned by 
KML, more than 5 000 artisanal miners were working there. And the government was well 
“represented” in the area: the national agency of enquiries (the secret services), the mines police 
(the section of the national police responsible for enforcing the law in mines), as well as a private 
security company, contracted by KCC (thus by KML), are evident controlling the area. Each of 
these services demanded payments or kickbacks from miners. Apart from the actors present in the 
area, there are further official bodies demanding their piece of the cake: the Ministry of Mines, the 
Customs Office, Kolwezi's City Council, the local traditional leaders and even the representatives of 
EMAC, the Artisanal Miners Association of Katanga (created to defend the miners' interests), etc. 
For the artisanal miner, the road to the sale of the minerals is thus full of hazards and the salary of 
the work will be inversely proportional to the number of intermediaries the digger meets before 
selling. 
 
Miners hunted ruthlessly 
 
Artisanal miners often work on old concessions of Gécamines or on land ceded by private 
companies. This state of affairs serves everyone: the government, who has no other jobs to offer to 
miners, and the private companies, who buy the minerals back at a good price. When the companies 
who own the concessions want to develop an industrial activity, the diggers will then be chased out 
unceremoniously. This often leads to violence and desperation. The field research led by Bench 
Marks Foundation reveals that artisanal miners – more than 10 000 – have been chased out of two 
mines of KML between August 2010 and February 2011, when Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) 
decided to recover its mining areas. In the summer of 2010, the police had to use force in the 
concession of Luilu, owned by KCC. They shot live bullets and the clashes ended with several 
people injured, although some local sources even talk of deaths.
19
 
 
As they buy back the minerals of artisanal miners, without trying to improve the situation in the 
concessions, KML and Glencore not only support extremely precarious situations but also favour 
child labour. As they accept the use of live bullets by the police on the miners in order to chase them 
away from the concessions, these two companies play a role in acute human rights violations. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19 Evidence gathered by the Bench Marks Foundation researchers, substantiated by the article: “Kolwezi : violents 
 combats entre policiers et creuseurs miniers artisanaux”, radio Okapi, 22 June 2010. 
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3.3 Labour rights in KML mines  
 
The precariousness of unions 
 
Labour rights including the right to strike do not sit well in the DRC, although the constitution 
guarantees workers the right to organise themselves and to join a union. In reality, these rights are 
often not respected. As a result, of the 24 million adults of working age, just 128 000 belong to a 
union.
20
 Union members face two main problems: outright repression and also the existence of 
“phantom unions”. According to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC-CSI), “the 
private sector is dominated by phantom unions, created by the employers using inactive members, 
in other to prevent any attempt of real organising.”21 Genuine union members often face repression, 
with arbitrary arrests, even torture.
22
 Newspapers also write regularly of brawls and strikes that are 
broken up by the police. In some plants, they do not even hesitate to call the police, renown for their 
repressive methods to stop protests in the mines or plants. In other cases, intimidation, and even 
violence, is used to repress workers by the private security services contracted by the mining 
companies. 
 
Previous to Kamoto Copper Company and DRC Copper and Cobalt receiving the concessions, a 
union existed in Gécamines. It opposed the contracts, especially taking issue with a clause stating 
that the new joint venture societies were not obliged to inherit the debts and delayed salaries 
Gécamines owed to the workers.
23
 Currently unions are hardly present in the mines of Katanga 
Mining Limited. According to a union representative of Kolwezi, the relation between the unions 
and Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) has become strained. It is thus difficult for workers to defend 
their rights. It is even rendered harder, according to a former human resources employee, by the 
close relationship that the company maintains with the local elites. According to several witnesses, 
“the mining code, whose main purpose is to guarantee the respect to certain norms, is not executed. 
Issues such as closure plans of some mines, human rights or the development of human resources 
are not discussed but completely ignored.” 
 
Work contracts 
 
In the mines of Kamoto Copper Company (KCC), owned by Katanga Mining Limited, 30% of the 
workers are sub-contractors. This number increases to 40% when it comes to the underground mine 
of Kamoto. The high percentage of sub-contracting workers increases the insecurity of working in 
the mines and is worsened by dangerous mine accidents. In fact, the workers have little knowledge 
when it comes to the constraints of their job and to what health and safety norms to follow. 
 
                                               
20 “2009 Country report on Human Rights Practices – Democratic Republic of Congo”, UNHCR, March 2010, section 
7, point a. 
21 “Internationally recognised core labour standards in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Report for the WTO 
General Council Review of the Trade Policies of Democrtic Republic of Congo”, International Trade Union 
Confederation, November 2010 
22 See in this regard the account given by ITUC: “On 19 January 2009, the president of the CCT, Nginamau Malaba, 
and two other trade union leaders were arrested by agents of the National Intelligence Agency after signing a 
memorandum denouncing the misappropriation of public funds by the Ministry of the National Economy and Trade. 
The three unionists were held captives for a month and tortured. They were released on 23 March for 150 dollars 
bail each but the magistrate refused to examine the unionists’ complaint on torture” in “Internationally recognised 
core labour standards in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Report for the WTO General Council Review of the 
Trade Policies of Democrtic Republic of Congo”, International Trade Union Confederation, November 2010 
23 “Internationally recognised core labour standards in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Report for the WTO 
General Council Review of the Trade Policies of Democrtic Republic of Congo”, International Trade Union 
Confederation, November 2010.  
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Health and safety in KML mines 
 
According to the president of the trade union in the Kolwezi mines, the mines of Katanga Mining 
Limited would be amongst the most dangerous exploitations of Africa's copper belt. This has 
resulted in most miners trying to avoid working for this company. In particular, the underground 
mine of Kamoto stands out, due to the high risks of floods and falling rocks. These accusations are 
confirmed by the statistics of KML who report that between 2009 and 2010, in the space of eleven 
months, 3 fatalities were reported in the mines of KML. In February of 2009, in the mine of 
Kamoto, one worker was killed by a falling rock. In March, in an open pit mine, a mineworker was 
killed by a mudslide. In January of 2010, a temporary worker died while working in a furnace of the 
minerals processing plant. The company reports do not include the number of non fatal accidents 
that take place in its mines and plants, which are several every month according to the union 
representatives. 
 
Despite the risks incurred by workers, KML does not undertake many safety measures. The Bench 
Marks Foundation researchers, who managed to anonymously access the mine in Kamoto, noted 
that there are no prevention signs in the area. Hence, there are no warnings about the dangers 
incurred by workers and very little information about measures of precaution to observe in order to 
limit the risk of accidents. 
 
The researchers also noted that workers did not receive appropriate protective clothing. In the mines 
of Kolwezi, the levels of uranium radiation are extremely high. But workers are not informed about 
the danger nor do they receive tools to measure the radiation levels in the underground mines of 
Kamoto. They do not have access to protective clothing to neutralise the effects of radiation. Yet 
exposure to the radiation of uranium may carry serious health problems, from a simple skin 
irritation to serious burns, also kidney and fertility problems.
24
 
 
Surrounding communities 
 
When it comes to the impact of mining in local communities, KML has yet to implement a credible 
dialogue with the communities located close to the mines. The field researchers met several 
community members who complained about damages caused to their environment. 
 
Abandoned villages 
 
The village of Musonoi, located on the outskirts of Kolwezi, is home to over 2 000 inhabitants. 
Successive mining areas surround the village. It is next to the mine T-17, owned by Kamoto Copper 
Company (KCC) and, thus, by Katanga Mining Limited. The village of Musonoi was created at the 
end of the 1930s. Since the 1960s, many workers of Gécamines established their homes there. 
Nowadays, life in Musonoi is precarious: the unemployment rates have increased dramatically and 
the infrastructures are no longer looked after. After the collapse of Gécamines, the majority of 
former workers did not find jobs in KCC, having to resort to artisanal mining. 
 
                                               
24 Regarding companies and uranium, see: “Africa offers Easy Uranium”, Julio Godoy, IPS, 26 December 2010 
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The town of Musonoi with the mine T-17 in the background 
Copyright: Bench Marks Foundation 
 
During the field research of the Bench Marks Foundation, the chief and a group of villagers 
denounced the negative impact in their homes of the mine T-17. Numerous houses show cracks and 
some roofs are collapsing due to blasting of the mine. Coughing is also common place due to the 
dust coming from the mine as the air often carries many particles. At certain points in the village 
there are piped water outlets where inhabitants fetch water. The quality of the water is questionable, 
especially with the tailings dam in the immediate vicinity. A nurse at Musonoi’s clinic informed the 
research team that respiratory problems and diarrhoea are most prevalent in the village. According 
to her, these diseases could be linked to the mining activities.  
 
 
House in Musonoi. The cracks due to blasting of the mine T-17 are clear. 
Copyright: Bench Marks Foundation 
 
In May 2010, with the assistance of an NGO in Kolwezi, the residents of Musonoi wrote a letter to 
Kamoto Copper Company complaining about the damages caused by the neighbouring mining 
activity. Glencore never responded to the letter. 
 
The scourge of polluted water 
 
In the village of Musonoi, and more generally in the whole of the mining region, the pollution of the 
water carries dangerous consequences for the health of the population. During their visit to the 
mining areas of KCC, the researchers noted the disastrous state of the water drainage pipes. As a 
 29 
result, there are frequent leaks, and the polluted water coming from the mine ends up spreading to 
the groundwater and to the surrounding fields. The piping of water that forms flooded pits is also 
highly problematic as it would seem as if the water is simply discharged into the river system. Water 
in flooded pits, having stood still for months, or even years, in inactive mines, could be 
contaminated with toxic substances, particularly uranium, sulphur, residues of blasting and diesel. 
According to local sources, the rivers of Musonoi and of Luilu are dangerously polluted. Tailings 
waste from the mines flow freely. Rock falls are frequent, whereby remnants of soil and waste, 
which may contain high levels of heavy metals, land in the nearby villages, fields and rivers. 
 
According to the Congolese mining code, Katanga Mining Limited must assess the social and 
environmental impact of its activities regularly.
25
 The company claims to have commissioned such 
assessment back in 2008.
26
 Yet the efforts of a civil society worker in Kolwezi to get hold of a copy 
of the study proved to be in vain as she never managed to gain access to the documents. The lack of 
transparency makes it tough for civil society actors to undertake follow up as well as control 
activities. 
 
The situation in the DRC is complicated: companies are required to submit environmental and 
social impact plans and assessments to the national authorities in Kinshasa. According to the 
Minister of Mines of the province of Katanga and of the division of Kolwezi, whom the researchers 
met in October 2010, the national Ministry of Mines never gives a copy of such assessments to local 
governments. Nor has the national Minister of Mines ever visited the mines of Kolwezi to verify 
that the companies implement their social responsibility programmes. 
 
3.4 Katanga Mining Limited and Glencore: companies carefully avoiding paying 
tax 
 
Tax evasion: how does it work? 
 
According to Tax Justice Network (of which Action de Careme and Bread for All are members), 
almost two thirds of the trade transactions take place amongst the different subsidiaries of the same 
company.
27
 Through these internal trade transactions, the companies manage to move their profits to 
tax havens, where they will not be taxed. That means that, for example,
28
 a ton of copper produced 
in Africa is sold by an African subsidiary of the company to the subsidiary of the same company 
based in Bermuda, who will then sell that ton of copper in the international market to a client in 
China. In order to push down the profits of the African subsidiary, the copper is first sold to the 
subsidiary in Bermuda for a “transfer price”, lower than the real market price. The African 
subsidiary will then record a considerably low profit and thus will pay almost no taxes. The 
subsidiary in Bermuda has not paid much for the copper but will sell it at market prices... thus 
making a considerable profit... which will not be taxed! The OECD guidelines establishes that 
“transfer prices” calculated by companies should correspond to market prices. But such guidelines 
are not compulsory but voluntary and thus have not been enforced. 
 
Consequences of tax evasion 
 
Tax evasion by big multinational corporations prevents developing countries from receiving much 
needed revenues which could be used for meeting its developmental challenges. According to 
                                               
25 See “Loi N0 007/2002 du 11 juillet portant code minier”, first Title, first chapter, point 19 (page 30). 
26 See “A Technical Report on the Material Assets of Katanga Mining Limited Katanga Province, DRC”, Tim 
Henderson, 31 March 2010, p.52. 
27 http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=144 
28 For other examples, see Bread for All/Action de Careme, “Le commerce des matières premières apporte richesse à 
quelques-uns et  misère à beaucoup”, Repères 02/2010. 
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Christian Aid, a UK-based Non Governmental Organisation, developing countries lose close to 
US$160 billion per year due to tax evasion!
29
 This amount is far larger than the development aid of 
US$120 billion, by the OECD countries in 2009.
30
 
 
Mining revenues in the DRC  
 
During the past decades, the revenues from the mining sector in the DRC have decreased. While the 
mining sector represented 70% of the revenues of the government of the Province of Katanga in the 
1980s, and 30% in 2002, the percentage fell to 7% in 2006.
31
 This is so despite the production of 
minerals having increased over the last few years. The reasons can be found at the door of both the 
Government and the corporations. Corruption and lack of coordination amongst the different state 
services responsible for the collection of taxes make it difficult for the collection of all due taxes to 
the Congolese government.
32
 On the other hand, the corporations use many tricks, aimed at 
avoiding the payment of taxes: falsified documents, illegally exported minerals and underestimated 
calculations of the quantity and quality of the minerals. 
 
Companies in the mining industry also take advantage of the confusion and proliferation of different 
laws and regulations to avoid the payment of taxes. A Senate report published in 2007 accused 
mining companies of “unduly profiting from the advantages of the Mining Code to the detriment of 
the State Treasury”.33 According to the report, the Congolese Treasury Department failed to collect 
US$92 million from a total amount due of US$205 million.
34
 Thus, the DRC lost 55% of the tax 
money due to it. 
 
However, according to the World Bank, the revenues of the mining sector could, if collected, 
represent between the 20% and the 40% of the public budget
35
 (that is, between US$200 million 
and US$400 million). The potential revenues for the State are thus significant. 
 
The Glencore “system” 
 
Glencore has a long history of controversial relations with the tax man in other countries as well. 
The US Justice wanted Marc Rich, the founder of Glencore, back in 1983, accused of evading taxes 
to the value of more than US$48 million (see Section 2.1). Glencore has its social base in Baar, a 
Swiss canton of Zug, which is known for its low tax rates. Furthermore, Glencore owns several 
subsidiaries in tax havens, such as Glencore Finance (Bermuda), Glencore Limited in Bermuda or 
Carlisa Investments in the British Virgin Islands. Through them, the corporation enjoys a great 
freedom of movement, in search of profits and tax optimisation. 
 
In February 2011, the “Glencore system” was under the spotlight in Zambia. Its subsidiary there, 
Mopani Copper Mine (MCM), which is an important producer of copper and cobalt, was suspected 
                                               
29 Christian Aid, “Death and Taxes: the true toll of tax dodging”, May 2008. Access under: 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/deathandtaxes.pdf 
30 http://www.alliancesud.ch/de/ep/eza/quantitaet/entwicklungshilfe-schweiz-2009 
31 “RDC : Banque mondiale et multinationales ont organisé le super-pillage des matières premières”, Tony Busselen, 
 CongoTimes, 5 April 2008 
32 “Can Katanga's mining sector drive growth and development in the DRC?”, Garrett, Nicholas, Lintzer, Marie, 
Journal of East African Studies, October 2010. Accessed under: 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a928458486~db=all~jumptype=rss 
33 http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=86716 
34 “Sénat de la République Démocratique du Congo, Rapport de la Commission d’Enquête sur le Secteur Minier 
(Rapport Mutamba) ”, September 2009. http://storage.canalblog.com/09/31/201811/45329150.pdf 
35 “Can Katanga's mining sector drive growth and development in the DRC?” Garrett, Nicholas, Lintzer, Marie, 
Journal of East African Studies, October 2010. Accessed under: 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a928458486~db=all~jumptype=rss 
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of being guilty of possible tax evasion at a large scale. The Zambian tax man realised that MCM 
was paying much too low taxes and subsequently mandated an audit report be done by a tax 
specialist on Mopani's activities between 2006 and 2008.
36
 While the report was done, Glencore's 
subsidiary did everything possible to stop or make the task of the auditors more difficult. The 
conclusions of the report are very enlightening as they found: 
 
 Inflated operational costs 
 Irregularities in the declared volumes of production by MCM 
 Under-pricing of copper and cobalt when selling to Glencore 
 Price arbitration used by MCM is abnormal and seems to purposely move out the profits 
from the country. 
 
Through inflated operational costs, undeclared production and under-priced exports, MCM would 
be seeking to decrease their profits in the country and avoid paying taxes to the Zambian Treasury. 
An observer of the mining sector, quoted by Reuters,
37
 declared that “it is common knowledge that 
Glencore never leaves crumbs on the table.” 
 
The taxes and royalties of KML 
 
KML's organisational chart is extremely interesting. It shows that Katanga Mining Limited (KML), 
same as Glencore, manages a network of subsidiaries in three tax havens:
38
 Bermuda, Virgin Islands 
and Isle of Mann. With these subsidiaries, KML can make use and abuse of transfer prices and 
lower the taxes due to the DRC. The chart also mentions one subsidiary in Baar, in the Swiss canton 
of Zug. According to the Swiss companies register, Katanga Mining Services AG is a service 
provider in the mining industry as well as trade.
39
 The director of KML Services in Zug, Nicholas 
Brodie, is also responsible for the finances of the parent company, Katanga Mining Limited, based 
in Bermuda.
40
 This structure would mean that the company based in Zug is “producing” bills or 
service fees, in order to lower the profits of KML in DRC. 
 
Structure of Katanga Mining Limited41 
 
 
 
                                               
36 “Counter Balance, Summary or the Pilot audit report – Mopani Copper Mine”, February 2011. 
37 http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110225/ts_nm/us_glencore_1 
38 “Counter Balance, Summary or the Pilot audit report – Mopani Copper Mine”, February 2011. 
39 See “ Katanga Mining Services” at www.moneyhouse.ch 
40 See www.katangamining.com, about us, senior management. 
41 “Katanga Mining Limited, Annual Information Form 2009”, p. 4. 
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Katanga Mining Limited (KML) is about to become the largest producer of copper in the DRC, but 
it will just pay minimal taxes (only US$1 million) between 2010 and 2013.
42
 In contrast, other 
competitors of similar size have paid higher taxes in the last years: First Quantum Minerals (FQM) 
paid US$57 million in taxes in 2009,
43
 and Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM) claims to have paid 
more than US$180 million in taxes between 2006 and 2009.
44
 
 
KML paid royalties to Gécamines, but they were negotiated to a very low level. KML pays 2% of 
the net revenues during the first four years. The percentage then decreases to 1.5%. The net 
revenues are calculated as follows: the total of the sales minus the transport costs, the quality 
control, the insurance as well as the marketing. Thanks to such deductions, the concept of “net 
revenues” may be a bit manipulated to the company's advantage.  
 
Hence, it seems that the “Glencore system” applied in Zambia by Mopani is quite close to that 
applied in the DRC by Katanga Mining Limited. That should not come as a surprise, if one realises 
that that two members of the executive board of KML, appointed by Glencore, are also members of 
the executive board of the Mopani mines in Zambia. In fact, one of them, Aristotelis Mistakidis, is 
the president of Glencore! In addition, before being appointed the executive director of KML, John 
Ross was project manager at the Mopani mines (see Section 2.3). Following the example of 
Mopani, KML sells its whole production to Glencore. 
 
KML and Glencore have highly profitable companies thanks to the rich subsoil of the DRC. Yet 
these profits are not shared equitably: the local population is not profiting from this. 
 
 
 
Glencore's headquarters in Baar, in the canton of Zug 
 
                                               
42 “KML Technical Report”, March 2010, p. 57. 
43 “Can Katanga's mining sector drive growth and development in the DRC?”, Garrett, Nicholas, Lintzer, Marie, 
Journal of East African Studies, October 2010. 
44 http://www.fcx.com/operations/downloads/TFM_CONTRACT_FACTS.pdf 
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4. Social and environmental responsibility: a comparative analysis of 
Glencore International AG and of Katanga Mining Limited 
 
4.1 Human rights in the DRC 
 
Human rights in the DRC are at high risk. In several reports, the UN, as well as NGOs and trade 
unions have documented human rights violations, workers rights and environmental norms abuse, 
by armed groups, governmental authorities and private companies. These reports also record the 
existing collusion within the elite networks and the pressure that potential whistleblowers 
experience. Human rights activists often go through arbitrary arrests, torture and receive frequent 
death threats. On 2 February, 2011, the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 
(OBS) published a public statement on the death threats received by Jean-Claude Katende and 
Georges Kapiamba, the national president and vice-president of the African Association for the 
Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO). The death threats followed their participation in a press 
conference to denounce the regime's intolerance to its political opponents.
45
 This was not the first 
time that publicly denouncing the regime had led to death threats. Back in May 2006, Jean-Claude 
Katende and Jean-Pierre Muteba, secretary general of the trade union Nouvelle Dynamique 
Syndicale (NDS), were threatened when speaking out against corruption, child labour, environment 
abuses and the violation of international law on social responsibility by mining corporations.
46
 
 
The field researchers of the Bench Marks Foundation recorded several abuses of human rights, 
workers rights and environmental norms. In this complex context, what were the responses from 
Glencore and Katanga Mining Limited? Did they put in place precautionary measures to stop such 
violations? Did they have a credible social responsibility policy? In this last chapter, Bread for All 
and Action de Careme have attempted to answer these questions. 
 
4.2 Glencore and KML: CSR policies lack credibility 
 
The analysis of Glencore International SA and of Katanga Mining Limited has been based on the 
following criteria: transparency, human rights, worker rights, relations with the community, 
business ethics and respect for the environment. These criteria are inspired by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), a multiparty initiative whose objective is to provide companies with guidelines 
when reporting their activities from a social and environmental point of view. The policies of 
Glencore and KML are also compared with other companies of similar size in the mining sector. 
 
In the mining sector, several companies are showing some degree of social responsibility in their 
willingness to be more transparent and committed to dialogue. On the ground and in their extracting 
chains, these companies often meet with problems; they can be denounced for their human rights 
abuses or environmental violations. Yet, on paper, they have in place policies and systems of social 
responsibility and present themselves as open to dialogue. 
 
Transparency  
 
Best practices – The most transparent companies in the mining sector publish very detailed reports 
on sustainable development, which cover all the social and environmental aspects of their 
performance. These reports provide information on their policies and management systems; they 
include quantitative indicators to measure the company's progress, for instance, in professional 
                                               
45 “Appel urgent de l’observatoire pour la protection des droits de l’homme, Menaces de mort en RDC”, 2 February 
2011 
46 “Menaces de mort contre des activistes qui ont dénoncé des abus dans le secteur des ressources naturelles en RDC”, 
 media release by the network Publish What You Pay, 5 May 2006. 
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accidents. Most of these reports follow the recommendations of the Global Reporting Initiative. 
Some reports are made by independent auditors, thus increasing the viability or integrity of the 
information as well as the credibility. The example of Freeport – McMoRan is interesting. This 
company publishes an annual report of approximately 50 pages, along with a second report based 
on the indicators proposed by the Global Reporting Initiative.
47
 The BG Group even keeps a 
website presenting all detailed statistics classified into different subjects.
48
  
 
Glencore and KML – are amongst the least transparent companies in their sector. Glencore 
publishes only three pages of general principles under the headline “sustainability”. The company 
provides no statistics, no indicators, nor any concrete description of their activities. KML publishes 
10 pages of general information on their social and environmental policies and programmes. No 
wonder the precise statistics, information about implementation measures and results achieved are 
lacking. 
 
Human rights  
 
Best practices – Companies are compelled to respect the principle of human rights included under 
national law. The best companies also refer to international law, that is, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Conventions of the International Labour Organisation, etc. Prior to investing in a 
country, these companies undertake various impact studies, adopt clear human rights policies and 
regularly control the implementation of such policies. 
 
The companies commit to make their areas secure while avoiding human rights violations yet they 
often use police and private security forces to do their dirty work for them. The violation of human 
rights takes place despite their commitment to control the private security forces they contract, and 
the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with public security forces. These companies are 
part of the initiative Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (PVSDR), launched in 
2000 and specifically targeting companies in the mining sector. 
 
Glencore and KML – Glencore claims to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but 
it does not mention any other international law. And it is not part of the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights. 
 
In 2008, KML gave a mandate to an independent firm to undertake an impact study on its activities 
in social and environmental terms. From the beginning, the firm wanted to use international 
standards (IFC performance standards and Equator Principles) for that purpose, yet it had to lower 
such ambitions. At the end of the day, the evaluation mainly sought to guarantee the DRC 
legislation.
49
 The results of the study are not public. KML claims to adhere to the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, but the company is not listed amongst the members of 
the initiative and gives no precise information on any implementation measures undertaken! This 
lack of engagement contrasts with the activities of Freeport-McMoRan, for instance, an American 
society working in the DRC with Tenke Fungurume Mining, one of the main competitors of 
Katanga Mining Limited.
50
 In 2009, Freeport-McMoRan, a member of the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights, organised 1 300 hours of training for private security forces involved 
in its operations in Katanga. The company also asked the governmental police forces to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding to make sure they respect a code of conduct when operating in the 
company's areas. 
                                               
47 See www.fcx.com/envir/sus_reports.htm 
48 See www.bg-group.com/sustainability 
49 “A Technical Report on the Material Assets of Katanga Mining Limited Katanga Province, DRC”, Tim Henderson, 
31 March 2010, p.52. 
50 See “Working Towards Sustainable Development, Report 2009”, Freeport-McMoran, page 17. 
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Police actions to break a strike at the Katanga plant 
Copyright: Thierry Michel 
 
Labour rights 
 
Best practices – All companies are expected to respect the ILO’s basic rights in particular the right 
of freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, two of the fundamental labour rights. 
The most pro-active companies sign collective labour agreements with trade unions or staff 
associations or committees. These agreements offer working conditions above the average within 
the field, be it for salaries, working hours or social benefit payments. The mining sector is known as 
a dangerous sector for its employees – there are many accidents, even deadly ones. The best 
companies have management systems in place to reduce the impact of their activities on the health 
and safety of their employees. These companies also produce low statistics when it comes to 
accidents and deaths. 
 
Glencore and KML – Glencore does not refer to the Conventions of the International Labour 
Organisation and does not claim to dialogue with staff representatives. It does claim to have 
management systems as well as health and safety programmes “fit to international standards”, but 
provides no detail about such policies and programmes. 
 
KML does not refer to the Conventions of the International Labour Organisation nor does it claim to 
dialogue with staff representatives. Yet it has developed a detailed policy on health and safety. Also 
its management systems adhere to an internationally recognised norm (OSHAS 18001). There are 
teams in every area tasked with the implementation and control of the health and safety 
performance. But the company provides no indication on the frequency or seriousness of accidents. 
It is thus impossible to ascertain the reliability of the implementation of all these programmes. This 
lack of transparency contrasts with the statistics provided, for instance, by First Quantum. Their 
statistics include the number of deaths as well as the number of accidents in each of the mines the 
company has worldwide.
51
 
 
Community relations  
 
Best practices – The most advanced companies in this aspect put in place programmes of voluntary 
                                               
51 See “Corporate Sustainability report 2010”, First Quantum Minerals LTD. 
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dialogue with the stakeholders and redistribute part of their profits to the neighbouring 
communities. They publish reports that record the donations made to the communities as well as the 
taxes they pay to the governments of the countries where they are active. They cooperate with the 
Initiative for the Transparency of Extractive Industries (ITIE), which promotes the publication of 
the money that companies in the mining sector pay to governments. 
 
Glencore and KML – Glencore claims that its presence has a positive impact on the local 
communities and that it promotes real dialogue with them. The company says it has put in place a 
mechanism to collect the complaints of these communities. But again they provide no details about 
the functioning of such mechanisms, the number of complaints they receive, nor the way the latter 
are treated. Glencore is not a member of the Initiative for the Transparency in Extractive Industries 
(ITIE). 
 
KML does not mention any systematic dialogue policy with the communities affected by its 
activities. KML mainly provides information about donations to, for instance, one hospital and one 
school. It claims to have donated US$20 million. KML is part of the Initiative for the Transparency 
of Extractive Industries (ITIE). Yet on their website, the company fails to provide any information 
about the amounts paid to the government. This lack of precision contrasts with the information 
provided, for instance, by Freeport-McMoRan in its annual report on social responsibility: the 
society details the taxes on its revenues, the taxes on its salaries, the dividends or even the royalties 
to the government of each country.
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Business ethics and corruption 
 
Best practices – The most proactive companies in the sector design policies to fight corruption: 
they appoint people internally in charge of their implementation. They suggest trainings and 
“hotlines” to managers in order to make it easy for employees to receive advice and to report 
corruption. Some companies publish the number of corrupt activities unveiled and the measures 
taken to fight them (for example, sanctions or dismissals). 
 
Glencore and KML – Glencore and KML do not give out much on such information and content 
themselves with declarations of intention such as “we do not pay kickbacks”, “we abide by the 
law”, or “we do not take part in criminal, fraudulent or corrupt activities”. Glencore claims to 
prevent problems through its procedures and internal policies, without giving further detail. KML 
provides no information on its procedures! 
 
Respect for the environment 
 
Best practices – Given its pollutant emissions (affecting air, water and ground), the mining sector 
carries huge environmental impacts. The most proactive companies have completed and perform 
management systems which allow them to limit the environmental impact of their activities. They 
set themselves ambitious goals to reduce their impact and actually reach them. They can prove with 
quantitative indicators that their environmental impacts per ton of minerals extracted have been 
reduced to the minimum. In this aspect, some companies subscribe to initiatives such as ISO 14001. 
This is the case, for instance, of BG Group, which provides on its website detailed statistics on the 
number of oil or water leaks recorded in the pipes of its exploitations.
53
 
 
Glencore and KML – Glencore admits that its activities have an environmental impact and it 
claims to have management systems and programmes to reduce its environmental impact “fit to the 
                                               
52 See “Working Towards Sustainable Development, Report 2009”, Freeport-McMoran, page 19. 
53 See www.bg-group.com/sustainability/environment/Pages/environment_performance.aspx 
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best international practices.” Again this is unsubstantiated. KML undertook a study of its 
environmental impact in 2008, through an independent auditing house. It also claims to set itself 
goals, but such goals are never published. 
 
None of these two companies publish any data on the impact of their activities on the air, the water 
or the ground, nor on their residues. It is thus impossible to evaluate their environmental 
performance. Yet their activities do have a huge environmental impact. For instance, Glencore 
indirectly emits huge quantities of CO2 (because of the burning of charcoal that it sells to customers) 
– the indirect emissions are three times the total of CO2 emissions in Switzerland.54 
 
                                               
54 The burning of charcoal produced annually by Glencore emits the equivalent to more than 150 million tons of CO2. 
Estimations by Bread for All and Action de Carême, based on the amounts of the productions of charcoal of 
Glencore and of its shares. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
There are several initiatives, multi-actor or not, that can help mining companies to implement their 
policies on risk prevention when it comes to human rights, environment and corruption. These 
include the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (PVSDH), the Initiative for the 
Transparency of Extractive Industries (ITIE) and even the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM). Other non-sectoral activities also support the implementation of management and 
evaluation systems, with precise indicators: ISO 140001, SA 8000, OHSAS 18001 or even the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Yet Glencore is not part to any of these initiatives. 
 
On its website, the Swiss company claims that its activities are guided by the Glencore Corporate 
Practice, in particular: “The respect to law, human rights, health and safety in the workplace for 
employees, protection of the environment as well as the satisfaction and well being of all their 
business partners, and of the neighbouring communities.” Yet these words are not followed by the 
appropriate actions: the field research led by Bread for All, Action de Careme and Bench Marks 
Foundation, reveals that labour rights as well as the best interest of the population, in general, and 
the surrounding communities are constantly overridden wherever Glencore invests in DRC. 
 
Despite the beautiful words, Glencore has yet to put in place a credible policy of social 
responsibility. Furthermore, and despite its massive profits, and the strategic place it holds in the 
global market, and its investments in countries where human rights are at high risk: Glencore gets a 
0 in terms of social responsibility! 
 
As the Swiss corporation plans to become listed in the stock market, it’s high time for its company 
culture to evolve towards greater transparency. It would also be about time for the Swiss 
government to take some measures to force companies such as Glencore to put in place credible 
measures of risk-prevention regarding human rights and the environment. Otherwise, these 
companies will continue forever to violate, with impunity, the fundamental rights of millions of 
people in the DRC, in Zambia and elsewhere. 
